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1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Legislation governing the implied – if not the literal – existence of 
associative discrimination has dwelled within the confines of UK 
domestic law for a number of years before being dramatically thrust into 
the spotlight by the “long-running saga” of Coleman v Attridge Law1 which 
has helped to raise the legal profile of discrimination by association”2. In 
Britain, its genesis is the result of a certain amount of incongruity between 
the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) of 19753 and the Race Relations Act of 
19764 which was further perpetuated by the Disability Discrimination Act 
of 1995,5 the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations of 
2003, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 
and Employment Equality (Age) Regulations of 2006. Indeed, so 
discordant and fragmented has the dissemination of these sections of 
legislation been, that the courts were obliged to rule on the basis of 
                                                 
* Pierre de Gioia-Carabellese is Senior Lecturer in Law at Heriot-Watt University. Robert 
J. Colhoun collaborates with the School of Management and Languages at Heriot-Watt 
University.  
1 Coleman v Attridge Law (2010) 1 C.M.L.R., 28. 
2 D. Christie, Discrimination by Association and the Equality Act 2010, 35 Scots Law Times 
194, 2010. 
3 Henceforth also the SDA 1975. 
4 Henceforth also the RRA 1976. 
5 Henceforth also the DDA 1995. 
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unintended6 subtle differences in language until the referral of Coleman to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for clarification. The 
set of EU Directives now in place are widely acknowledged as the catalyst 
for the recent consolidation and extension of domestic anti-discrimination 
provisions under the Equality Act of 20107. In addition, if set in 
juxtaposition with UK domestic implementation, they provide fertile 
ground for exploring any prior discrepancies and assessing to what extent 
harmony now prevails. For the purposes of integrity, on the one hand a 
candid evaluation of the likely burden determined by the foregoing 
developments on employers with regard to recruitment, workplace 
policies and flexible working arrangement requests will reduce the 
practical context within which the legislative impact can be placed. On the 
other hand – and to a certain extent to supply the empirical analysis with 
higher levels of reliability – a comparative analysis of a general nature shall 
be drawn, particularly by placing an emphasis on both similarities and 
differences permeating this area of law in both Britain and Italy, the latter 
being the comparator employed for the purposes of such a methodology. 
 
 
2. Discrepancies within UK Domestic Legislation 
 
The doctrine of transferred discrimination, into which associative 
discrimination became subsumed8, came to fruition in light of the subtle 
differences in wording incorporated within the SDA 1975 and the RRA 
1976. The former contains a possessive element in that9: “[...] a person 
discriminates against a woman if – on the ground of her sex10 he treats her less 
favourably than he treats or would treat a man [...]”. 
Accordingly, a literal reading of the this wording lent the courts no room 
to manoeuvre with regard to discrimination by association and contrasts 
starkly with that of the RRA 1976 as11: “[...] A person discriminates against 
another [...] if: (a) on racial grounds12 he treats that other less favourably than 
he treats or would treat other persons [...]” 
                                                 
6 It is maintained that “the difference in language was never considered by Parliament”. 
See S. Forshaw, M. Pilgerstorfer, Taking Discrimination Personally? An Analysis of the Doctrine 
of Transferred Discrimination King’s Law Journal 19, No. 2, 2008, 266. 
7 Henceforth also the EA 2010. 
8 S. Forshaw, M. Pilgerstorfer , op. cit., 265, 292. 
9 SDA 1975, s 1(1), as subsequently amended. 
10 Emphasis added.  
11 RRA 1976, s 1(1), as subsequently amended. 
12 Emphasis added.  
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As a natural consequence, the absence of a formulation of a possessive 
character widened the scope within which relevant legislation could be 
applied, with this aspect which had indeed already been recognised in the 
case of Race Relations Board v Applin13, where similar wording under the 
Race Relations Act 1968 had permitted Stephenson LJ to determine that 
“A can discriminate against B on the ground of C’s colour, race or ethnic 
origin”14. In reality, Stephenson LJ provided a simplified definition of 
associative discrimination in that “the discrimination is transferred onto 
another by virtue of the association which a person has with that other”15.  
In keeping with the more expansive language of the RRA 1976, the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations of 2003 made use 
of the expression “on grounds of sexual orientation”16 while the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 resorted to 
the formulation “on the grounds of the religion or belief”17. However, it is 
the explanation of the provisions of both sets of regulations laid down by 
the DTI (2003) which revealed, for the first time, the main reasoning 
embodied in the foregoing wording18: “[...]direct discrimination [...] covers 
discrimination against a person by reason of the sexual orientation / 
religion or belief of someone with whom the person associates. For 
example, an employee may be treated less favourably because of the 
religion of his or her partner, or because his or her son is gay”. 
Either side of such conclusive assumption mutually reflected in the 
relevant wording and a lack of consistency emerged with regard to the 
DDA of 1995 and the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations of 2006.  
In this sense, more recent legislation attempted at reversing the possessive 
criterion discussed above, maintaining that19: 
“[...] a person (‘A’) discriminates against another person (‘B’) if – (a) on 
grounds of B’s age20, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would 
treat other persons [...]”. 
In a similar vein, any potential for associative discrimination appeared 
outside the scope of the DDA 1995 as21: “[...] a person discriminates 
                                                 
13 Race Relations Board v Applin (1973) QB 815.  
14 Ibid., 831.  
15 S. Forshaw, M. Pilgerstorfer, op. cit., 268. 
16 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations of 2003, s 3(1).  
17 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003, s 3(1). 
18 DTI (2003), Explanation of the Provisions of the: Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations of 2003 and Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations of 2003, par. 26.  
19 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations of 2006, s 3(1). 
20 Emphasis added. 
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against a disabled person if – (a) for a reason which relates to the disabled 
person’s disability22 he treats him less favourably than he treats or would 
treat others[...]”. 
S 3A (5) of the piece of legislation in question accounted for another 
provision “on the ground of the disabled person’s disability” adding 
further credence – if any were needed – to the strict interpretation which 
could be sanctioned by the domestic courts. Indeed, such a narrow 
reading compelled the Employment Tribunal, with respect to Coleman, to 
refer the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether the 
parameters of the Framework Directive23 extended to protect against 
discrimination by association.  
 
 
3. The European Stance 
 
In stark contrast with the disparities discussed earlier which overarch UK 
non-discrimination legislation, a number of EU Directives on the matter 
resonate with unfettered uniformity.  
Among them, Directive 2000/78/EC is particularly relevant to the 
discussion at hand, as it lays down that24: “[...] direct discrimination shall 
be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any 
of the grounds referred to in Article 125[...]”. 
The protected grounds covered by Directive 2000/78/EC under Article 1 
are religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation while similar 
terminology is evident in Directives 76/207/EEC and 2006/54/EC -
mainly related to sex discrimination – and in Directive 2000/43/EC 
dealing with racial or ethnic origin discrimination. Such uniformity then 
appeared to leave room for a creative reading which empowers the CJEU 
to acknowledge the existence of discrimination on the grounds of 
association. This aspect is further evidenced by the emphatic reiteration, 
under Article 2 (1) of Directive 2000/78/EC, according to which “there 
shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the 
grounds referred to in Article 1”. Evidently, the expansive nature of the 
                                                 
21 DDA 1995, s 3A(1).  
22 Emphasis added. 
23 Hereafter, Directive 2000/78/EC.  
24 Directive 200/78/EC, Art.2(2)(a). 
25 Emphasis added.  
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language enshrined in the Directives is a matter for debate, alongside the 
terminology originating from the philosophical domain of jurisprudence.  
In assessing the merits of Coleman, the Advocate General concluded that: 
“[...] if someone is the object of discrimination because of any one of the 
characteristics listed in Article 1 then she can avail herself of the 
protection of the Directive even if she does not possess one of them 
herself. It is not necessary for someone who is the object of 
discrimination to have been mistreated on account of ‘her disability’. It is 
enough if she was mistreated on account of ‘disability’ ”26. 
The rationale upon which these concluding remarks were founded was 
attributed – in more concrete terms – to the demonstrable terminology of 
Directive 2000/78/EC where “on any of the grounds” indirectly 
prescribed that liability should have hinged on the act of discrimination, 
irrespective of whether the employee herself had a disability. At a more 
philosophical level, the Advocate General referred to Article 13 of the EC 
Treaty in reasoning that a commitment to the principles of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination therein laid the foundations for their 
practical realisation through Directive 2000/78/EC, as evidenced in 
Mangold v Helm27. In relating this train of thought to a yet more 
fundamental source, equality embodies the values of “human dignity and 
personal autonomy”28 which are placed in jeopardy not only by 
discriminating against someone having a protected characteristic directly, 
but also “by seeing someone else suffer discrimination merely by virtue of 
being associated with him”29.  
The Advocate General reasoned that such subtle means of discrimination, 
in seeing the employee as a conduit “through which the dignity of the 
person belonging to a suspect classification is undermined”30, negatively 
affected the ability of this person to “exercise their autonomy”31 by 
targeting those associated with them and was therefore unlawful per se.  
Armed with a veritable amount of philosophical reasoning which paves 
the way for “a more secure jurisprudential basis from which future 
applications of the equal treatment principle of the framework Directive 
                                                 
26 AG Para. 23 of Coleman. 
27 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm (2005) ECR I-9981, para. 74. 
28 Par. 8 of Coleman. 
29 Par. 13 of Coleman. 
30 Par. 13 of Coleman. 
31 Par. 14 of Coleman. 
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2000/78/EC could have been made”32, the CJEU (strangely) chose to 
sidestep the issue. Rather, it focused primarily on observing the dual 
agenda of “combating every form of discrimination” and facilitating the 
“social and economic integration of disabled people”33. To this end, it 
held that Directive 2000/78/EC should not be interpreted strictly34 as this 
approach would be “liable to deprive that Directive of an important 
element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is 
intended to guarantee.”35 
A cursory overview of the European stance would thus acknowledge the 
inception of discrimination by association as a matter of European Law. 
However, on closer inspection, several issues remained unsolved. Firstly, a 
potentially and unanticipated side effect of Coleman arose relating to the 
prerequisite proximity a carer must demonstrate having to the person 
carrying a protected characteristic. In other words, would the ambit of 
associative discrimination extend to cover a carer in cases where the 
complainant was not the primary carer? No elucidation on the subject was 
provided by the CJEU, as Coleman involved a primary carer although any 
unfavourable answer to this question would undeniably cast doubt on the 
much vaunted commitment to the principle of equal treatment espoused 
by the judgment handed down by the Courts. Secondly, the CJEU 
maintained the stance adopted in Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA36 
that “the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC cannot be extended beyond the 
discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the 
Directive”37. In so doing, it deemed long-term sickness to be temporary 
and thus outside the scope of the Directive, whereas the disability 
protected therein should have been exclusively that of a permanent 
nature38. Associative discrimination against a carer of someone suffering 
from long-term sickness would therefore appear to flounder on such 
rigorous boundaries leaving a more expansive interpretation of what 
constitutes a disability as a future recourse whereby the CJEU may better 
                                                 
32 T. Connor, Case C-303/06 Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law Judgment of the ECJ 17 
July 2008; Discrimination by Association: a Step in the Right Direction, Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law 32, No. 1, 2010, 66. 
33 Cited under Recital 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC and referred to in Para. 43 of Coleman. 
34 Par. 46 of Coleman. 
35 Par. 51 of Coleman. 
36 Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA (2006) ECR I-6467. 
37 Par. 46 of Coleman. 
38 Par. 45 of Coleman. 
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amalgamate human rights and equal treatment into EU law39. Finally, 
Coleman failed to address the scope for indirect associative discrimination 
as the case in hand was direct in nature and the Courts confined their 
ruling accordingly. It was thus left open to debate whether it was 
deliberately excluded or latently included40. A literal reading of Directive 
2000/78/EC Article 2(2)(b) would however appear to exclude this 
possibility due to the possessive wording restricting indirect 
discrimination to “persons having41 a particular religion or belief, a 
particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation.” 
Nevertheless, it is arguable once again that a failure to recognise indirect 
associative discrimination would contravene the principle of equal 
treatment.  
 
 
4. Preamble to the Equality Act 2010 
 
As EU Directives cannot be directly applied to cases involving private 
persons, Coleman was returned to the ET where the principle of indirect 
effect came into play. In essence “was it really ‘possible’ within the UK’s 
‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation, to interpret the national law to be 
consistent with the Directive?”42. An answer in the affirmative appeared, 
at least at a theoretical level, to be shackled with inherent complications 
as, although the DDA 1995 was not consistent with Directive 
2000/78/EC, the Government could not have foreseen that this Directive 
would be interpreted to include discrimination by association eight years 
later. If it had, this would have been reflected in the wording of the 2003 
amendments and/or the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. Nor could 
the interpretation of the foregoing statutes as excluding associative 
discrimination be considered to pave the way for an absurd or repugnant 
result in court. Nevertheless, the ET and – on appeal – the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT) inferred that the intention of the 2003 
                                                 
39 L. Waddington, Protection for Family and Friends: Addressing Discrimination by Association, 
European Anti Discrimination Law Review 13, No. 5 2007, 21. 
40 C. O’Brien, Equality’s False Summits: New Varieties of Disability Discrimination, “Excessive” 
Equal Treatment and Economically Constructed Horizons, European Law Review 36, No. 1, 2011, 
26, 50. 
41 Emphasis added. 
42 T. Hervey, M Reeves, H Rodgers, B Ridingm, T Roberts. Case C-303/06 Coleman v. 
Attridge Law and Steve Law Judgment of the ECJ 17 July 2008; Judgment of the Employment 
Tribunal, London, 30 September 2008, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 31, No. 3, 2008, 
310. 
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amendments had been to fully implement Directive 2000/78/EC and 
thus upheld the preliminary ruling of the CJEU by indirect effect on 
grounds tantamount to those articulated previously by the Advocate 
General: Employment Judge Stacey reasoned that discrimination by 
association would “offend the principle of equal treatment, autonomy, 
human dignity and self-respect”. In protecting these principles, the ET 
and EAT had, in effect, bypassed the ordinary canons of statutory 
interpretation to facilitate a direct effect of Directive 2000/78/EC 
between private parties. Judge Stacey may well have envisaged the end 
justifying the means from a human rights perspective. However, it was 
hardly a satisfactory legal means to justify such an end. 
Although Coleman was concerned solely with disability discrimination and 
thus introduced associative discrimination into EU and domestic law in 
regard to that protected characteristic, the proclivities of the foregoing 
judgments seemed to indicate that the courts would henceforth rule in 
unison across the spectrum of prohibited grounds43. However, the case of 
Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish44 imparted a telling reminder that such a 
conclusion was premature at best and presumptuous at worst when the 
EAT ruled that Directives 92/85/EEC and 2006/54/EC could not be 
read to deal with associative discrimination as Directive 2000/78/EC had 
so crucially in the case of Coleman. Nevertheless, the tide was shifting in 
the judicial arena and domestic legislation would have to keep pace45. 
Indeed, the SDA 1975 (Amendment) Regulations of 2008 stood testament 
to this when – albeit in relation in harassment – s 4A was recast, in 
response to Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry46, to include harassment by association. With the preamble 
concluded, the scene was set for a streamlining of domestic equality law in 
harmony with its EU counterpart under the Equality Act 201047. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 M. Pilgerstorfer, Transferred Discrimination in European Law, Industrial Law Journal 37, No. 
4, 2008, 384, 393.  
44 Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish (2011) I.C.R. 48. 
45 S. Honeyball, Discrimination by Association Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, 2007, at 
webjcli.ncl.ac.uk (last accessed 19 June 2012). 
46 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 2007, 
IRLR, 327. 
47 C. O’Brien, op. cit., passim. 
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5. The Equality Act 2010: from Discord to Harmony?  
 
As for the previous EU Directives, the Equality Act of 2010 makes no 
explicit reference to associative discrimination per se. Rather, in keeping 
with the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations and the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003, it relies on 
a set of accompanying explanatory notes to unearth the underlying 
reasoning48. As for the Act itself, direct discrimination would now occur 
when49: “A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of50 a 
protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would 
treat others”. 
In a deliberate departure from the prevailing variations of “on grounds 
of”, the Government cited “accessibility to the ordinary user” as the 
overriding factor in the above deviation from “because of”.51 However, 
despite its insistence that the change in wording would not alter the legal 
meaning52, criticism has arisen53 and “litigation on the meaning of the 
phrase[...]seems inevitable”54. As for indirect discrimination55: “A person 
(A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, 
criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant 
protected characteristic of B’s”.  
Therefore, whereas direct associative discrimination is implicitly 
subsumed within the Equality Act 2010, any possibility of an indirect 
form is explicitly excluded. It remains to be seen whether the European 
Courts will provide more clarity on the issue in future after failing to do 
so in Coleman56. Greater transparency is also given by a decidedly more 
thorough examination of exactly what constitutes a disability in terms of 
length57, ambit58, occurrence59 and treatment60 while prior tribunal rulings 
                                                 
48 Direct discrimination “is broad enough to cover cases where the less favourable 
treatment is because of the victim’s association with someone who has that 
characteristic” Equality Act 2010, Section 13 Explanatory Notes. 
49 Equality Act 2010, s 13(1). 
50 Emphasis added. 
51 Equality Act 2010, s 13 Explanatory Notes. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See, for example, the concerns of the Discrimination Law Association and the arguments 
of S. Belgrave, The Ins and Outs of the Equality Bill 16 No. 7, Employment Lawyers Association 
Briefing, 2009, 88, 90. 
54 D. Christie, op. cit., 193, 196. 
55 Equality Act 2010, s 19(1). 
56 C. O’Brien, op. cit., passim. 
57 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 1, par. 2(1). 
58 Ibid., par. 6. 
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have provided a lengthy list of conditions under which disability might 
take place (Labour Research Department). However, as with the CJEU in 
Coleman, the prerequisite proximity of a carer to the disabled person is left 
open to judicial interpretation61. 
The protected characteristics, now harmonised under s 4 of the EA 2010, 
are age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex and sexual 
orientation. Of these, only marriage and civil partnership is not protected 
from direct discrimination by association62 although a small exception 
applies with regard to the characteristic of age63. As Kulikaoskas had been 
dismissed on the grounds that the SDA 1975 did not cover associative 
discrimination – and European law did not require it to64 – it is interesting 
to note that such a case could now be successful if brought under the EA 
201065. 
 
 
6. Associative Discrimination across the Channel: the “Elastic” 
Nature of Italian Discrimination 
 
To further corroborate the specific scope of this analysis, it may be of 
interest to briefly appreciate how the concept of associative discrimination 
has been crafted in legal terms, judicially interpreted and doctrinally 
dissected in one of the other countries belonging to the EU. By way of 
example, the concept of associative discrimination in Italy has never been 
formally at threat, due to the implementation of both Directive 2000/43 
and Directive 2000/78. In considering the discriminatory nature of the 
                                                 
59 Ibid., par. 8 and par. 9. 
60 Ibid., par. 5. 
61 A. Eriksson, European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of European non-Discrimination 
Law, International Journal of Constitutional Law 7, No. 4, 2009, 731, 753. 
62 Ibid., s 13 (4). 
63 Ibid., Schedule 9, Part 2, par. 15. 
64 The SDA 1975 was explicit in prohibiting discrimination against a woman on grounds 
of her pregnancy. Therefore, a literal reading could not incorporate the scope for 
associative discrimination. Furthermore, in respect to Kulikaoskas, relevant European 
legislation was the Pregnant Workers Directive and the Equal Treatment Directive, as 
opposed to the Framework Directive relied upon in Coleman – a Directive which was 
drafted in a much broader manner. 
65 There is a general lack of clarity as to whether a claim for associative pregnancy 
discrimination would now be successful despite the harmonization of this area of law 
under the Equality Act 2010. Therefore, the onus will be on future case law to provide 
direction. 
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status laid down in Italian law, Legislative Decree No. 216/2003 has never 
made reference in its wording to personal pronouns such as “his/her”66. 
Therefore, as correctly emphasised by a number of scholars67, the ratio 
decidendi in Coleman does not find – or rather, has never found – obstacles 
in the Italian legislative framework. A major risk arising from Italian 
legislation is that of a rather elastic interpretation of discrimination – 
hence “elastic” discrimination – where the principle of exclusivity of the 
protected characteristics, as established by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades68, could be affected. 
                                                 
66 The text of the Legislative Decree 216/2003 stipulates as follows: 
“[…] [P]er principio di parità di trattamento si intende l'assenza di qualsiasi discriminazione diretta o 
indiretta a causa della religione, delle convinzioni personali, degli handicap, dell'età e dell'orientamento 
sessuale. Tale principio comporta che non sia praticata alcuna discriminazione diretta o indiretta, così 
come di seguito definite: 
Discriminazione diretta quando, per religione, per convinzioni personali, per handicap, per età o per 
orientamento sessuale, una persona è trattata meno favorevolmente di quanto sia, sia stata o sarebbe 
trattata un’altra in una situazione analoga; 
Discriminazione indiretta quando una disposizione, un criterio, una prassi, un patto o un 
comportamento apparentemente neutri possono mettere le persone che professano una determinata religione 
o ideologia di altra natura, le persone portatrici di handicap, le persone di una particolare età o di un 
orientamento sessuale in una situazione di particolare svantaggio rispetto ad altre persone”  
([…] By principle of equal treatment it shall be meant the lack of any discrimination, 
either direct or indirect, on the ground of religion, personal believes, disabilities, age and 
sexual orientation. Such a principle means that no discrimination, either direct or 
indirect, shall be applied, more specifically as defined below: 
Direct discrimination in cases where, on the ground of religion, personal believes, 
disabilities, age or sexual orientation, a person is treated less favourably than a 
different person, in a similar circumstance, is treated, has been treated or would be 
treated in a similar circumstance. 
Indirect discrimination in cases where a provision, a criterion, a practice, an 
agreement or a behaviour ostensibly neutral may cause (i) people who hold a religion 
or ideology of different nature, (ii) people affected by a disability, or (iii) people 
belonging to a particular age group or having a specific sexual orientation, to be 
affected by a condition of disadvantage in comparison to other people)  
In Italy a brief analysis relating to discrimination may be found in A. Vallebona, Istituzioni 
di Diritto del Lavoro, 2 Il Rapporto di Lavoro, 7th ed., CEDAM, 2011, 309, 318. See also M. 
Barbera (ed.), Il Nuovo Diritto Antidiscriminatorio, Giuffre', 2007.  
67 See L. Calafà, Disabilità, Discriminazione e Molestia “Associate”: il Caso Coleman e l’Estensione 
Elastica del Campo di Applicazione Soggettivo della Dir. 2000/78, 4 Rivista Critica di Diritto del 
Lavoro, No. 4, 2008, 1169, 1172. The author stresses verbatim as follows: “[..] si può ricordare 
che il principio di diritto sancito dalla sentenza Coleman non trova ostacoli specifici al suo 
funzionamento” ([..] it can be reminded that the principle of law introduced by the Coleman 
case does not encounter any specific obstacles as regards its functioning).  
68 SA(C-13/05). 
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However, the answer to this doctrinal question69 is that such a bête noire – 
thanks to the Attridge Law decisum – has been de facto tamed. This is 
because, as a result of the acknowledgement of associative discrimination, 
the protected characteristics remain nonetheless the limited number 
(numerus clausus) legislated under Art.13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is 
unquestioned though, also in a legal system such as the Italian one, that, as 
a result of Coleman, those who are potentially the victims of an act of 
discrimination may not be identified in advance, but for the generic and 
nebulous caveat of the closeness being met. As correctly pointed out by a 
number of scholars, in interpreting the ruling, the close relationship, such 
as mother/child but also further relationships, should nonetheless be 
implicitly consistent with the required criterion. 
 
 
7. Consequences for Employers 
 
The Coleman verdict provided due warning to employers that equal 
opportunity policies and practices would need to be fully assessed70 and 
purposeful steps taken to educate and train their respective workforces 
with an increased awareness of associative discrimination in mind71. If this 
warning was observed, the enforcement of the EA 2010 would have 
served as a simple confirmation that their foresight had been justified. 
However, even in such a scenario, events were not straightforward as “the 
risk of [...] associative [...] discrimination is not immediately obvious”72. 
Indeed, although the EA 2010 had provided higher levels of clarity for 
employers in terms of what constitutes a disability along with the 
exclusion of indirect associative discrimination, confusion surrounded the 
issue of proximity and with a significant amount of workers combining 
work with unpaid care it is conceivable that tribunals could face a flood of 
claims. As any claim for compensation would be uncapped in such 
circumstances, employers must take reasonable and well documented 
steps, in order to avoid discrimination by association, with regard to 
recruitment and promotion policies or face a potentially considerable 
cost73. 
                                                 
69 See particularly L. Calafà, op. cit.  
70 T. Connor, op. cit. 59, 69. 
71 J. Amphlett, A Caring Attitude, European Lawyer 11, No. 82, 2008. 
72 E. Bartlett, Legislative Comment: Equal Measures, European Lawyer 45, No. 102, 2011. 
73 J. Amphlett, op. cit., passim. 
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Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the impact arising from recent 
developments comes in the problems employers may face at the time of 
considering requests for flexible working arrangements. In Britain, the 
statutory right was extended to parents of children under six – or under 
18 for a disabled child – by the Employment Act of 2002 and to carers of 
adults by the Work and Families Act of 2006. Burdened with the 
possibility that a refusal may now amount to discrimination by 
association, employers must base such decisions on robust business 
reasons and adequately document these grounds to show that all requests 
are handled dispassionately and fairly. In addition, any lateness or absence 
relating to caring responsibilities must be handled carefully to ensure, for 
example, that cases relating to care for the elderly are not treated less 
favourably than those for childcare74. Similarly in Italy, in looking at the 
matter of the associative discrimination from a wider perspective, it is also 
inevitable to come across sections of legislation partly overlapping with 
the new concept; for instance, the forms of leave specifically allowed to 
employees – so that they can look after people close to them with 
disability – has been recently introduced in the national legal system, 
thanks to Law no. 183/2010, and relevant Legislative Decree No. 
119/2011, particularly art. 3 and 475.  
In other words, it seems that the expansion of the concept of 
discrimination – insofar as to encompass the elastic nature of 
discrimination – enthusiastically promoted at the heart of the EU, is not 
totally consistent with the acknowledgment, at domestic level76 in some 
European countries, of similar rights recognised to employees/workers, 
through the several forms of leave. As a result, the matter ultimately needs 
an immediate and profound rethinking. As present, it is difficult to not 
recognise that the new area of law – marked by the elastic character of 
discrimination – carved with generosity by the speculative stances of the 
European Union legislator, particularly its “judicial arm” (the CJEU), fails 
to clarify the concept further and certainly leaves the business at a 
standstill, as they may not be totally aware of the legal consequences of 
their decisions to so crucial a business matter, such as human resources 
management. In a time when European institutions should harmonise 
rules, rather than fragmenting them, the elastic dimension of 
discrimination, coupled with the additional legal burdens set up at 
                                                 
74 J. Amphlett, op. cit., passim.  
75 See O. Bonandi, I Diritti Dimenticati dei Disabili e dei loro Familiari in seguito alle Recenti 
Riforme, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e delle Previdenza Sociale No. 4, 2011, 779, 818. 
76 The example of the UK and Italy has been explained in this work. 
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domestic level in each EU country – devoid of homogeneity and with no 
limit – might compel more than an isolated observer to raise an eyebrow.  
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, over 40 years of fragmented and piecemeal domestic 
legislation had contributed to several discrepancies with regard to the 
scope to which it could be applied in prohibiting discrimination in the 
workplace. The manifestation of such inconsistencies in the wording of 
these provisions revealed a glaring deviation from the homogeneity of 
language within EU Directives, an issue brought conclusively to light by 
Coleman. However, although clarity may have prevailed in terms of the 
language used in the Directives, the CJEU preliminary ruling in Coleman 
was rather less so with ambiguity surrounding the extent to which 
associative discrimination should be covered; a state of play perpetuated 
further by Kulikaoskas. Therefore, in an attempt to both harmonise UK 
legislation and conform to EU law, the EA 2010 represented a merging of 
nine protected characteristics, of which eight were now implicitly 
safeguarded from discrimination by association. As for harmonisation 
between EU and UK law, it appears that the latter might have gone 
beyond minimum implementation, although any future vestige from the 
EU on the possibility of indirect associative discrimination would be cause 
for reassessment. As for employers, in light of Coleman and the EA 2010, 
reasonable steps must be taken in implementing adequate recruitment, 
promotion and equal opportunity policies while demand for flexible 
working arrangements must be fairly assessed and documented to guard 
against the risk of less favourable treatment. All in all “it seems likely that 
the road to outlawing discrimination by association will have a few more 
twists and turns yet”77.  
In response to a wider European scope of literature78 provided on this 
concept allowing for an alternative country analysis,79 de iure condendo, 
therefore in the way the legislation should be reformed, the European 
Union legislator should better address this matter and clarify, through an 
amendment of Directive 2000/78, the concept of “associative” – or 
elastic – discrimination itself. Furthermore, the Directive should offer 
greater transparency, particularly in respect to the principle of closeness so 
                                                 
77 D. Christie, op. cit., 196. 
78 As regards Italy, see L Calafà, op. cit. 
79 Particularly the glimpses of comparative analysis provided under Chapter 6 supra. 
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as to eliminate any room for discretion exercisable by both the domestic 
legislator and/or domestic courts from the outset.  
The aspect pointed out in this work is that the terminology used in 
legislating on associative discrimination act is dissected and interpreted 
across the different EU jurisdictions – as is the case of the UK and Italy – 
in totally different ways among courts and still ignored by the local law-
makers, albeit somehow tolerated. This may represent a potential issue, in 
terms of identification of the relevant right bestowed upon the victim as 
well as measures to be adopted by the employers. 
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